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Abstract

The rules governing negligent infliction of emotional distress claims differ significantly from state to state. The
predominant rule is the bystander recovery rule, which permits recovery by persons who are not physically
threatened by the defendant’s negligent conduct but who suffer emotional distress from witnessing injury to a
third person. In bystander recovery jurisdictions, the required degree of proximity of the plaintiff to the
accident scene, how the plaintiff hears about the accident, the plaintiff ’s relationship to the person actually
injured in the accident, and the proof required to establish severe emotional distress vary, sometimes
significantly, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The purpose of this Article is to review the response of Engler v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. to the issue of whether a plaintiff in the zone of danger should be entitled to
recover damages for emotional distress arising from fear or anxiety for the safety of a third person, primarily
against the backdrop of the Minnesota experience with negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Part II
of this Article sets out the primary Minnesota emotional distress cases in order to provide a context for the
discussion of Engler in Part III. Part IV looks at the mechanics of applying Engler in the future. Part V is the
conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION

The rules governing negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims differ significantly from state to state. The predominant rule
is the bystander recovery rule, which permits recovery by persons
who are not physically threatened by the defendant’s negligent
conduct but who suffer emotional distress from witnessing injury to
a third person. In bystander recovery jurisdictions, the required
degree of proximity of the plaintiff to the accident scene, how the
plaintiff hears about the accident, the plaintiff’s relationship to the
person actually injured in the accident, and the proof required to
establish severe emotional distress vary, sometimes significantly,
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The zone of danger rule, adopted in Minnesota in 1892 in
1
Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway, was at one time the dominant
approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in the
United States, but only a minority of jurisdictions adhere to that
rule now. The zone of danger rule requires proof that the plaintiff
was physically threatened by the defendant’s negligence, feared for
his own safety, and suffered severe emotional distress as a result.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has tightened the zone of danger
rules, requiring proof that the distress resulted in physical
symptoms and, as a practical matter, that the proof be bolstered by
medical testimony connecting the physical symptoms to the
emotional distress.
Until recently, one question the supreme court had not
directly addressed was whether a plaintiff in the zone of danger
should be entitled to recover damages for emotional distress arising
from fear or anxiety for the safety of a third person. The court
2
resolved that issue in Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. The
purpose of this Article is to review Engler’s response to this issue,
primarily against the backdrop of the Minnesota experience with
3
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Part II of this
Article sets out the primary Minnesota emotional distress cases in
order to provide a context for the discussion of Engler in Part III.
Part IV looks at the mechanics of applying Engler in the future. Part
V is the conclusion.
1. 48 Minn. 134, 139, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892).
2. 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 2005).
3. See generally Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1993) (providing a detailed analysis of the
law governing emotional distress in Minnesota through 1993).
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN MINNESOTA
The following section is an abbreviated discussion of
Minnesota emotional distress cases that will provide the context for
the subsequent discussion of the Engler case. The cases discussed
span the past one hundred years. Most of the cases involve
negligent infliction of emotional distress, but not all. The
discussion includes two cases involving intentional infliction of
emotional distress to determine the interrelationship, if any,
between negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
law. Each of the cases marks a key point in the development of the
right to recover damages for emotional distress in Minnesota.
A. Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.
In Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., the plaintiff,
along with his wife and daughter, was driving his carriage along a
highway when his team of horses ran into a barb wire fence that the
4
defendant had negligently placed on the highway. His horses
became entangled in the fence wire, and so did he when he tried to
5
free them. The horses were plunging and rearing and he told his
6
wife to jump out of the carriage. At trial his counsel asked him if
7
he suffered any mental anxiety for his family. He said that he
8
feared not so much for himself as he did for his wife and daughter.
The issue on appeal was whether it was error to admit that
9
evidence. The supreme court said that it was not reversible error
to admit the evidence, but that in general, compensable mental
distress and anxiety in a personal injury action has to be connected
10
with physical injury to the person. The court thought that the
evidence concerning the plaintiff’s anxiety for his wife and
11
daughter would be inadmissible under that rule. Keyes appears to
be the first Minnesota case involving the issue of whether damages
may be awarded for fear for the safety of a third person. It takes a
restrictive view in indicating that recovery should not be allowed for
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

36 Minn. 290, 291, 30 N.W. 888, 888 (1886).
Id. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 292, 30 N.W. at 889.
Id.
Id. at 293-94, 30 N.W. at 889-90.
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fear for a family member’s safety, even where the plaintiff is not
only physically threatened, but actually suffers personal injury.
B. Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway
Six years later, in 1892, in Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway, the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger rule in a
case where the plaintiff alleged that she suffered a miscarriage as a
consequence of being involved in a near accident when the
streetcar in which she was riding crossed the track of a cable-train
12
line, almost colliding with a rapidly approaching cable train. She
alleged that the imminence of the collision, ringing of alarm bells,
and passengers rushing out of the car caused her nervous shock
13
resulting in a miscarriage. The supreme court concluded that the
fact the miscarriage was a product of nervous shock would not
automatically be a superseding cause:
Whether the natural connection of events was maintained,
or was broken by such new, independent cause, is
generally a question for the jury. In this case the only
cause that can be suggested as intervening between the
negligence and the injury is plaintiff’s condition of mind,
to-wit, her fright. Could that be a natural, adequate cause
of the nervous convulsions? The mind and body operate
reciprocally on each other. Physical injury or illness
sometimes causes mental disease, a mental shock or
disturbance sometimes causes injury or illness of body,
especially of the nervous system. Now, if the fright was the
natural consequence of—was brought about, caused by—
the circumstances of peril and alarm in which defendant’s
negligence placed plaintiff, and the fright caused the
nervous shock and convulsions and consequent illness,
the negligence was the proximate cause of those injuries.
That a mental condition or operation on the part of the
one injured comes between the negligence and injury
does not necessarily break the required sequence of
14
intermediate causes.
C. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle, a
12.
13.
14.

48 Minn. 134, 137, 50 N.W. 1034, 1034 (1892).
Id.
Id. at 138, 50 N.W. at 1035.
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1963 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, also involved a bystander
15
recovery issue, but in the context of a Civil Damage Act claim. It
is a frequently cited decision because it delineated certain
exceptions to the Minnesota zone of danger rules. Because of the
importance of those exceptions, the following discussion of the
case is detailed.
One of the issues in the case concerned the right of the
plaintiff, who might be termed a remote bystander, to recover
damages for mental anguish in a Civil Damage Act claim against
the Village of Isle for the illegal sale of alcohol that contributed to
permanent and disabling injuries, including brain damage,
16
suffered by her husband in a car accident.
In response to a
question concerning the post-accident impact on her, the plaintiff
testified she was nervous and worried all the time, and that she was
17
unable to relax because she had to constantly watch her husband.
The plaintiff was not present at the scene of the accident involving
18
19
her husband. All her emotional distress occurred later. The
trial court in the case submitted the plaintiff’s claim for loss of
20
means of support as well as mental anguish to the jury. The jury
awarded the plaintiff damages for both loss of means of support
21
and for injury to her person. On appeal, the supreme court held
that the evidence was insufficient to support her claim for injury to
22
In what has become a standard statement in
her person.
23
emotional distress cases in Minnesota, the court said:
It is well established that damages for mental anguish or
suffering cannot be sustained where there has been no
accompanying physical injury . . . unless there has been
some conduct on the part of defendant constituting a
direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution,
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious
15. 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963).
16. See id. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 43.
17. Id. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41.
18. Id. at 362, 122 N.W.2d at 38.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41.
23. E.g., Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d
557, 560 (Minn. 1996); M.H. v. Caritas Fam. Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn.
1992); Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
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24

misconduct.
Notwithstanding the frequent repetition of the phrase in the
Minnesota cases, it is not entirely clear exactly what the court
meant in suggesting that a plaintiff could recover for emotional
harm absent physical injury if the defendant’s conduct is “willful,
wanton, or malicious.” The court cited four cases in support of that
25
26
proposition: Larson v. Chase, Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co.,
27
Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway Co., and Beaulieu v. Great Northern
28
Railway.
Larson was an 1891 case involving the mutilation and dissection
of the plaintiff’s deceased husband’s body, in which the plaintiff
29
had a legally protected interest.
The plaintiff alleged that she
30
In
suffered mental suffering and nervous shock as a result.
holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the court
recognized that mental suffering would be compensable if it is
proximately caused by a “wrongful act” constituting “an
31
infringement on a legal right.” As an example, the court noted
that substantial damages could be recovered in a class of cases in
which only mental injury is claimed, as in an assault case without
physical contact, or in a false imprisonment action, even if
32
“physically the plaintiff did not suffer any actual detriment.”
33
Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co. was decided in 1906. The
court considered the right of the plaintiff to recover for physical
harm caused by emotional shock from a highly invasive trespass,
including a search of her house and displacement of her personal
belongings, by two railroad employees who were apparently looking
34
for railroad property. The court’s statement of the facts notes
that “[s]he was frightened by their acts, and immediately after they
left she became sick, feverish, her head ached, she trembled, and
35
had spells of vomiting.” She was confined to her bed for some two

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 41 (emphasis added).
47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906).
48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
Larson, 47 Minn. at 308, 50 N.W. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 240.
Id.
97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906).
Id. at 504-05, 106 N.W. at 956.
Id. at 505-06, 106 N.W. at 956.
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weeks and “was not well for a considerable time afterwards.” The
defendant argued that the fright suffered by the plaintiff was not
37
the product of any legal wrong against her. Citing Purcell, the
court said the law in Minnesota is “that there can be no recovery
for fright which results in physical injury to the plaintiff, unless the
fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong against the plaintiff
38
by the defendant.” The court also noted that “[i]t is a matter of
common knowledge that fright may, and often does, affect the
nervous system to such an extent as to cause physical pain and
39
serious bodily injury.”
The court noted that while the plaintiff’s husband had legal
title to their home, she had an interest in it, and “[a]ny unlawful or
wanton invasion of, or interference with, such right would be a
legal wrong against her within the meaning of the rule, which is to
be liberally construed and applied in cases where the defendant’s
40
acts are wanton and ruthless.” The court held that the evidence
was sufficient to establish that the defendant’s employees
committed a tort when they invaded the plaintiff’s peaceful
enjoyment of her home and interfered with her personal wearing
41
apparel.
42
Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co., decided in 1907,
involved a suit against a common carrier for breach of contract for
failure to deliver the corpse of the plaintiff’s deceased child on
43
time for his funeral. The plaintiff alleged the delay resulted in the
44
deterioration of the corpse. The court noted that the issue of
whether mental anguish is recoverable in either a contract or tort
45
action has resulted in a substantial conflict of opinion. The court
recognized that damages for mental anguish are recoverable in
cases in which the plaintiff is physically injured by the defendant,
or where the plaintiff has a claim for slander or malicious
prosecution, or “in those willful wrongs where some legal right has
been invaded, though no physical injury is inflicted or character or

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 956-57.
Id., 106 N.W. at 957.
Id.
Id. at 506-507, 106 N.W. at 957.
Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 957.
Id.
103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
Id. at 48, 114 N.W. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353.
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46

reputation assailed.” Beaulieu, in turn cited Purcell, Lesch, and a
47
Sanderson
third case, Sanderson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.
involved a claim by a mother for emotional harm from witnessing a
train conductor attempting to put her children off a train because
of her husband’s refusal to pay a half fare for their children, having
48
made prior arrangements for them. As a result, she alleged that
she suffered fright and shock, and her husband alleged that he
49
The trial court granted the
incurred medical expenses.
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on Mrs. Sanderson’s
50
claim at the close of the evidence. The supreme court affirmed,
holding that “there can be no recovery for fright which results in
physical injuries, in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the
plaintiff, unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong
51
against the plaintiff by the defendant.” There was no conduct
constituting a legal wrong directed against the plaintiff in that case.
In context, it seems clear that when the court in the State Farm
case stated that recovery for mental anguish will be allowed where
the defendant commits some other tort, slander, for example, or
52
for “other like willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct,” the
court is referring to a defined tort or interference with a legally
protected interest of the plaintiff—not, as the terms “willful,
53
wanton, or malicious” might imply, conduct that necessarily
involves particularly egregious conduct by the defendant. That
degree of culpability is certainly not a necessary element of a libel
or slander case, although that element may be involved in
malicious prosecution cases, where malice is an essential element of
54
the claim. It would also apply to other intentional torts—battery,
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 88 Minn. 162, 163-64, 92 N.W. 542, 543 (1902).
49. Id. at 164, 92 N.W. at 543.
50. Id. at 164-65, 92 N.W. at 543.
51. Id. at 166, 92 N.W. at 544.
52. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 368, 122
N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963).
53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (8th ed. 2004) defines “willful and wanton
misconduct” as “[c]onduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for
the safety of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known
danger or to discover a danger,” or “willful indifference to the safety of others.”
The term willful misconduct is difficult to define, “but it is clear that it means
something more than negligence.” Id. (quoting FRANK L. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A
NUTSHELL 185-86 (3d ed. 1996)).
54. See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (there
must be proof that “(1) the action was brought without probable cause or
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for example, where the supreme court has previously clearly held
that a plaintiff is entitled to recover for emotional distress flowing
from the battery, even absent any real physical harm, and where
much of the claimed mental suffering and humiliation did not
55
result in physical symptoms.
If “willful and wanton misconduct” is defined as “[c]onduct
committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety
of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known
56
danger or to discover a danger,” or “willful indifference to the
57
safety of others,” the potential exists for an expansion of the basic
zone of danger rules in cases where the necessary degree of
culpability on the part of the defendant can be established.
Assume, for example, that the plaintiff is a bystander who
suffers serious emotional distress after witnessing injury to a close
family member caused by a defendant who has driven recklessly,
perhaps while intoxicated, just to emphasize the defendant’s
culpability. Minnesota’s zone of danger rule would clearly bar
recovery under a negligence theory. The issue is whether the
exception would kick in to permit recovery because of the reckless
conduct of the defendant. The supreme court’s opinion in Lickteig
v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A. may support that
58
proposition.
reasonable belief that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits; (2) the
action must be instituted and prosecuted with malicious intent; and (3) the action
must terminate in favor of [appellant]” (quoting Kellar v. VonHoltum, 568
N.W.2d 186, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)). Seduction claims are of course no
longer permitted. See MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (2004).
55. See Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 225, 91 N.W.2d 756, 764 (1958).
The court of appeals decision in Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), shows how the concept works. The plaintiff in the case sued for
battery for an unwanted sexual advance—a kiss. 424 N.W.2d at 804. The jury
awarded him substantial compensatory damages. Id. at 801. He testified at trial
that the kiss made him sick and upset, enough so that he related the incident to
several friends. Id. at 804. The defendant argued that there was no evidence to
corroborate the plaintiff’s claim of emotional harm. Id. at 805. However, the
plaintiff’s confidants had testified that he was upset. Id. He also had a
psychologist with expertise on victims of sexual harassment who assessed the
plaintiff testimony that he suffered the kind of emotional and psychological
trauma that can arise from such an incident. Id. The court of appeals found the
evidence sufficient to justify the verdict, even though it did not meet the standards
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 804-05.
56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996). Alternatively, the tightness of the rule
creates the possibility that cases will be forced into the specific categories even if
they may not belong there. In Gooch v. North Country Regional Hospital, No. A05-
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Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A.

In Lickteig, a legal malpractice suit, the plaintiff claimed
damages
for
emotional
harm
based
on
negligent
59
misrepresentation, as found by an arbitrator. The plaintiff was
obviously not in the zone of physical danger and did not suffer
60
physical injury. The court held that “[d]amages for emotional
distress could be justified only [if] the appellants violated [the
61
plaintiff’s] rights by willful, wanton or malicious conduct.” The
ordinary rule would be that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover damages for emotional harm in a legal malpractice case,
but Lickteig indicates that if the defendant’s conduct is egregious
576, 2006 WL 771384 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006), the plaintiffs sued the
hospital for the loss of their stillborn fetus. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs sued for the
hospital’s negligent and careless loss of the fetus. Id. at *2. The hospital argued
that the plaintiff’s claim was in actuality a negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim. Id. Had it been treated that way the plaintiffs would have lost the case
because they were not in the zone of danger of any physical injury.
The trial court, following Lickteig, concluded the plaintiffs had to establish
that the defendant’s conduct was willful and wanton in order to be entitled to
recover for emotional harm. Id. at *3. The court of appeals held that the trial
court correctly instructed the jury that “a person behaves willfully when he or she
knows or has reason to know that an act is prohibited by a policy, rule, regulation,
statute, or law and intentionally does it anyway,” but that the jury could not
reasonably have found that the defendant acted willfully. Id. (quoting 4A
MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 25.40 (4th ed. 1999)). On
the other hand, the court of appeals held the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the defendant acted wantonly, which was defined as “[a]n act, or failure to act
when there is a duty to do so, in reckless disregard of another’s rights, coupled
with the knowledge that injury will probably result.” Id. at *4 (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (7th ed. 1999)).
The court considered prior Minnesota cases involving interference with
dead bodies, but concluded that it is unclear “whether a claim for wrongful
interference with a dead body can be supported by a showing of mere negligence,
or whether it requires a showing of willful or wanton misconduct similar to an
NIED case.” Id. at *2. The court attributed the lack of clarity in the law, in part, to
the fact that earlier “cases arose before the evolution of the law that replaced many
of the intentional torts with the developing rule of ‘negligence’ as the measure of
the duty of care owed in tort.” Id. That is possible, although negligence theory
had rounded out in Minnesota in the early twentieth century. See O’Brien v. Am.
Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910) (defective construction of
public bridge). More likely, the cases involving interference with dead bodies
have simply been regarded as a unique category, given the likelihood that in this
category of cases emotional harm is likely to arise. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B.
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54
(5th ed. 1984).
59. 556 N.W.2d at 559.
60. Id. at 559-60.
61. Id. at 560.
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62

enough recovery would be allowed.
If the zone of danger
requirement of actual physical danger is waived because of the
defendant’s culpability, there should be no reason why a bystander
would not be entitled to recover for emotional distress. The
question is whether the court really meant what it said, given the
potential implications. The source of the problem is the broad
statement in State Farm.
E. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp.
63

In Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., in 1969, the plaintiff suffered a
strong emotional reaction as the result of the collapse of a wall that
was under construction as part of an addition being added to the
64
store that the plaintiff was in at the time of the collapse. The
plaintiff became sick and numb as a consequence, was hospitalized
for five days, and thereafter continued to suffer from persistent and
65
severe pain in her head, back, and leg. Her physician testified
that, in addition to her pain, her personality changed and she
became moody and introspective because of the fright she
66
experienced because of the wall collapse. The court concluded
that the plaintiff sustained a physical injury as a result of her mental
anguish, that she feared for her own safety, and—to distance her
claim from the plaintiff’s claim in the Village of Isle case—that “her
67
distress was not occasioned by concern for the safety of others.”
The court concluded that her right to recover was supported by the
68
evidence. While the defendant argued that the injury was not
foreseeable, the court noted that “foreseeability is a test of
69
negligence and not of damages,” and that if the defendant can
foresee some harm to a person to whom the defendant owes a duty,
it is unnecessary for the defendant to be able to foresee the exact
70
nature and extent of the harm.

62. Id. at 561-562.
63. 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
64. Id. at 401-02, 165 N.W.2d at 261.
65. Id. at 403, 165 N.W.2d at 262.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 404, 165 N.W.2d at 262 (discussing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963)).
68. Id. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263.
69. Id. (citing Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 456, 107 N.W.2d 859, 862
(1961)).
70. Id.
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Stadler v. Cross

The court specifically rejected the bystander recovery rule in
71
1980, in Stadler v. Cross. The court’s rejection of that rule reflects
its intent to establish limits on recovery that are “workable,
72
reasonable, logical, and just as possible,” and its concern that a
limit that is not susceptible to consistent and meaningful
application by courts and juries would result in the arbitrary and
73
capricious imposition of liability.
The court remained
unpersuaded “that the problems we see in limiting liability once it
is extended beyond the zone of danger of physical impact can be
74
justly overcome.”
The court said that it did not consider as
dispositive other factors typically advanced against bystander
recovery, including “the fear of a proliferation of claims, the
potential for fraudulent claims, the foreseeability of the injury, and
75
unduly burdensome liability.”
G. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont
The Minnesota Supreme Court has been clear that negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases are limited to cases where the
claimant is in the zone of physical danger. In Langeland v. Farmers
State Bank of Trimont, decided in 1982, the plaintiff landowners lost
their right to redeem their farm from mortgage foreclosure due to
76
the defendants’ misinterpretation of the redemption statute. The
plaintiffs sought to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional
77
distress, in addition to other theories.
The court noted that
negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the claimant to
have “been in some personal physical danger caused by the
78
defendant’s negligence.” One of the striking aspects about this
rather clear limitation on negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims is how often the decision seems to be ignored. Negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims are routinely asserted in cases
where the plaintiff is not in the zone of physical danger, and courts

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555 n.3.
319 N.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
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79

H. Dornfeld v. Oberg
The supreme court’s 1993 decision in Dornfeld v. Oberg involved
a case that seemed to fit squarely in the zone of danger rules
established by the court, with the added element that the plaintiff
was claiming damages as a result of mental suffering caused by her
husband’s death in an automobile accident in which she was also
80
involved. The plaintiff’s husband was killed while changing a tire
81
on their vehicle when he was hit by an intoxicated driver. The
plaintiff was in the car at the time and felt an impact, according to
82
the supreme court opinion. The court of appeals opinion stated
83
she was “tossed around,” although she did not suffer any
84
significant physical injury as a result of that impact.
She did,
however, claim that she began to suffer from post-traumatic stress
syndrome/disorder (PTSS/PTSD), and that she suffered
deterioration in her memory, was unable to retain a job, and had
85
terrible nightmares because of the accident.
A psychiatrist
86
testified at trial that the PTSS was triggered by the accident. The
plaintiff asserted both negligent and intentional infliction of
87
emotional distress claims. The jury found that she was in the zone
of danger and that she reasonably feared for her own safety, but
88
that her emotional distress did not arise out of that fear. The jury
also found that the defendant Oberg’s extreme and outrageous

79. E.g., Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.
1998) (failure of psychiatric nurse to prevent abuse did not place plaintiff in zone
of physical danger); Porter v. Children’s Health-Care Minneapolis, No. C5-981342, 1999 WL 71470 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999) (failure to immediately grant
admission to emergency room); Schmidt v. HealthEast, No. C1-96-152, 1996 WL
310032 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11, 1996) (denial of workers’ compensation claim);
Anderson v. Morris Excavating, Inc., No. C5-95-404, 1995 WL 407436 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 19, 1995) (trespass on property by workers performing maintenance
work on a sewer line).
80. 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993).
81. Id. at 116.
82. Id. at 117.
83. Dornfeld v. Oberg, 491 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev’d on
other grounds, 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993).
84. Id.
85. Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 117.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 116 & n.1.
88. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 299.
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89

driving was reckless. Those findings would seem to support the
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff
was in the zone of physical danger. Even more, she actually
suffered an impact, which presumably would entitle her to recover
for all damages flowing from that impact. That claim derailed,
however, and ended up as a claim for intentional infliction of
90
emotional distress. Had the case arisen after Lickteig v. Alderson,
91
Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., one wonders if the result would
have been different, given the finding of reckless misconduct.
In Dornfeld, the court of appeals held that when the supreme
court adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
92
in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., it did not change
settled law that permits recovery for emotional harm by a person in
93
the zone of danger. The court of appeals said that a plaintiff is
still entitled to recover under section 46(2) of the Restatement
94
(Second) of Torts, which permits recovery by a person who suffers
severe emotional distress when the conduct of the tortfeasor is
95
directed at a third person.
The supreme court distinguished the zone of danger cases
because they arose under a theory of the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress, not intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and also because the negligence cases such as Stadler
96
required proof of physical injury as a requirement. The plaintiff
in Dornfeld did sustain physical injury, certainly, in the form of
97
physical consequences flowing from the emotional distress. This
would ordinarily satisfy the zone of danger proof requirement for
physical symptoms arising from the emotional harm.
The court, however, interpreted section 46(2) of the
98
Restatement (Second) of Torts to require an element of intent on the
89. Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 117.
90. Id. at 120 (holding plaintiff could not recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because the car’s driver had not directed his behavior at her
and had not been aware of her presence).
91. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996). For a discussion of the case, see supra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
92. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
93. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 300.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).
95. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 300.
96. Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 1993).
97. Id. at 117 (stating plaintiff complained of memory deterioration, inability
to retain jobs, and terrible nightmares as a result of the accident).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).
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part of the defendant, and held that in order to find Oberg liable
for the reckless infliction of emotional distress it would have to
“find that his actions were intentionally ‘directed at’ [Dornfeld’s]
99
husband,” and denied recovery on that basis. Of course, intent is
typically at the base of all negligent or reckless acts. A person
intends to drive at an excessive rate of speed, for example, and that
creates a risk of injury to third persons; but for conduct to be
reckless, it need not be directed toward any specific individual.
The court in Dornfeld confused the intent requirement with the
recklessness requirement. It assumed that the requirement of an
intentional act for reckless misconduct meant that the defendant
Oberg had to have intended to hit the plaintiff’s husband in order
100
for Oberg’s conduct to have been “directed at” the husband.
That is not what the recklessness standard means. The Restatement
clearly recognizes that a defendant may be liable for the reckless
infliction of emotional distress by creating a high degree of
101
probability that the distress will occur. This standard differs from
intent cases where the defendant’s purpose is to cause the distress
or where the defendant knows to a substantial degree of certainty
that the distress would occur. The court’s reading of the
recklessness standard would effectively cut it out of the Restatement.
The real question is why the zone of danger rule should have
presented a barrier to recovery, particularly since the plaintiff was
not only in the zone of danger, but also suffered a physical impact,
even though the injuries were not significant. If she sustained even
minor injuries, she should have been entitled to recover for the
damages that were directly caused by the accident.
I.

K.A.C. v. Benson

In K.A.C. v. Benson, the supreme court summarized the law
governing negligent infliction of emotional distress in a case
involving a claim by a patient against a physician with AIDS who
102
performed a gynecological exam on her.
The plaintiff sued

99. 503 N.W.2d at 119. In Anderson, the court of appeals used Dornfeld’s
analysis to conclude that the plaintiffs were not in the zone of danger of physical
injury because the defendant’s conduct was directed toward their property.
Anderson v. Morris Excavating, Inc., No. C5-95-404, 1995 WL 407436, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 11, 1995).
100. See Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 119-20.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i. (1965).
102. 527 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1995).
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under a variety of theories, including negligent infliction of
103
The court held that the plaintiff was not in
emotional distress.
the zone of danger for purposes of the negligent infliction of
104
emotional distress claim.
105
Drawing on Stadler, the court first set out the standard
elements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, which
require a plaintiff to show that she “(1) was within a zone of danger
of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for her own safety; and
(3) suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical
106
manifestations.”
The court’s subsequent discussion deviated slightly from the
standard elements from Stadler, however:
This court has limited the zone of danger analysis to
encompass plaintiffs who have been in some actual
personal physical danger caused by defendant’s
negligence. Whether plaintiff is within a zone of danger is
an objective inquiry.
Thus, cases permitting recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress are characterized by a reasonable
anxiety arising in the plaintiff, with attendant physical
manifestation, from being in a situation where it was
abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril
for some specifically defined period of time. Fortune
107
smiled and the imminent calamity did not occur.
The discussion prompts a question as to whether the supreme
court intended to magnify the requirements for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, although it seems reasonable to assume that
the court was simply summarizing the kinds of cases where
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims have been
108
successful.
J.

Navarre v. South Washington County Schools
Where there is a statutory violation and the statute provides a

103. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 560.
105. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980).
106. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557.
107. Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
108. The supreme court noted the added discussion in Wall v. Fairview Hospital
& Healthcare Services, 584 N.W.2d 395, 408 (Minn. 1998). The court of appeals
repeated it in an unpublished decision, Graham v. Independent School District 625,
No. A05-201, 2005 WL 3159742, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005).
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specific remedy, damages for emotional distress may be awarded
even if the more stringent standards for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims are not met. In Navarre v.
109
South Washington County Schools, a teacher sued a school district
for violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
because of its release of certain private personnel data concerning
110
the teacher’s classroom management and instruction.
She
sought to recover for emotional harm because of the statutory
111
112
violation.
Relying on Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. and
113
Gillson v. State Department of Natural Resources, the court of appeals
stated broadly that “[i]n cases involving violation of a statutory
right, emotional-distress damages are recoverable absent evidence
114
of verifiable physical injury or severe emotional distress.”
Williams, an Eighth Circuit case, held that damages are to be
presumed in a Title VII employment discrimination case where
115
there is a violation of a substantive constitutional right. Gillson, a
Minnesota Court of Appeals case involving a Minnesota Human
Rights Act violation, held that damages for emotional harm may be
awarded based solely on subjective testimony without a showing
116
that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering was severe.
The supreme
court, in Navarre, somewhat obtusely distinguished both cases—
Williams because it involved the violation of a substantive
constitutional right and Gillson because it involved discriminatory
117
conduct similar to that in Williams.
The supreme court further
concluded, however, that the plaintiff was still entitled to recover
damages for emotional harm for a violation of the Data Practices
Act because of the broad remedy provision stating that an entity
violating the Act “is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage
118
as a result of the violation.”
109. 652 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 2002).
110. Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 633 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001).
111. Id.
112. 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981).
113. 492 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
114. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d at 54.
115. 660 F.2d at 1272.
116. 492 N.W.2d at 842.
117. Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 29-30 (Minn. 2002).
118. Id. at 30 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 1 (2004)). In Scott v.
Minneapolis Public Schools, Special District No. 1, No. A05-649, 2006 WL 997721
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006), the court of appeals seemed to read Navarre more
broadly. The case also involved a violation of the Minnesota Government Data
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The court noted its traditional conservatism in cases involving
damages awards for emotional harm, and also that the plaintiff in
the case “failed to produce any verifiable medical or psychological
119
evidence to support her claim,” although she did introduce
evidence that the disclosure of the information caused her to be
120
“extremely upset and caused her to be afraid to go out in public.”
The court held that while the evidence was conclusory and
unsubstantiated by medical testimony, it was sufficient to justify
121
submitting the claim for emotional damage to the jury. In a later
122
opinion, the supreme court in Langeslag v. KYMN Inc. noted that
the “appropriate method of proving the severity and causation of
123
emotional distress is through medical testimony,” but made a
124
point of stating that it did not intend to overrule Navarre. While
Navarre should not be read broadly, given the supreme court’s
traditionally cautious approach to cases involving claims for
emotional harms, it does indicate that establishing a statutory cause
of action may be one way to avoid the stringent damages
requirements of the prevailing negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress law.
K.

Summary
In summary, at the time the Engler case arose, the right to

Practices Act. The court cited Navarre for the proposition that “[m]edical-expert
testimony is not a prerequisite to recovering damages for emotional distress.” Id.
at *6 (citing Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 30). The court cited Lickteig for the
proposition that the plaintiff “must nonetheless ‘prove that emotional injury
occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.’” Id. at *6
(quoting Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557,
560 (Minn. 1996)). The court’s subsequent discussion indicating that medicalexpert testimony is unnecessary to establish a claim for emotional distress seems to
be generalized, and not limited solely to cases involving a violation of the
Government Data Practices Act. See id. at *6-*7. The court in Lickteig, however,
confines the seemingly broad statement made in Scott by noting that it is an
exception to the general rules governing recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 556 N.W.2d at 560. Suffice it to say that the supreme court’s
subsequent decisions seem to impose the more rigid physical symptoms and
medical evidence requirements as necessary conditions to guarantee the
genuineness of emotional distress claims.
119. Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 30.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 664 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2003). For an in depth discussion of Langeslag,
see infra notes 199-232 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 870.
124. Id. at 870 n.9.
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recover for emotional distress in Minnesota reduced to several
mostly settled principles:
1. A plaintiff who sustains a physical injury is entitled to
recover for the emotional harm flowing from that
injury.
2. A plaintiff who does not suffer physical harm but is in
the zone of danger of physical harm and who
reasonably fears for his/her own safety is entitled to
recover for severe emotional distress with attendant
physical manifestations if appropriate medical evidence
supports the distress and causation requirements.
3. A plaintiff who is not in the zone of danger of physical
impact is entitled to recover damages for emotional
harm if there is a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s
rights, as in slander, libel, or malicious prosecution
cases, or for other intentional torts, such as battery.
4. A plaintiff is also entitled to recover for other willful,
wanton, or malicious misconduct. The exact meaning
of the term is unclear, although the most logical
assessment is that it simply means that there is liability
for emotional distress flowing from the commission of
other torts, rather than from any conduct that may be
labeled willful and wanton.
5. A plaintiff who asserts a statutory cause of action may
be able to recover for emotional distress without
proving physical symptoms and supporting medical
evidence on the severity and causation issues.
III. ENGLER V. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE CO.
A. The Facts
Geralyn Engler and her two sons, Jacob and Jeffrey, were
riding in a vehicle driven by Geralyn’s boyfriend, Brent Renner,
when four-and-a-half year old Jeffrey said he had to go to the
125
Renner pulled the car to the side of the rural road
bathroom.
they were driving down, and Jeffrey got out of the car and walked
126
about thirty feet to the tree line by the road.
As Beverly Wehmas was driving down the road, nearing where
125.
126.

Engler v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 766.
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Renner’s car was stopped, she lost control of her vehicle, which
127
veered toward Renner’s car and the tree line where Jeffrey was.
Engler first thought that the vehicle was going to hit her, but then
128
she realized that it was going to strike Jeffrey instead.
She
screamed and turned away just before he was hit by Wehmas’
129
vehicle.
She rushed to Jeffrey and carried him back to Renner’s
130
Jeffrey was seriously injured in the accident and spent four
car.
131
He was scarred as a result of the
days in intensive care.
132
accident.
Engler stated in her deposition that “she sought medical
treatment a few months after the accident because she ‘did not feel
133
like herself.’”
She was also “irritable, did not want to get out of
134
She was
bed, cried frequently, and had lost all ambition.”
135
The
diagnosed by her physician with PTSS and depression.
136
physician prescribed antidepressants for her.
Engler sued Wehmas, asserting a claim of negligent infliction
137
The district court denied the defendant’s
of emotional distress.
motion for summary judgment and certified to the court of appeals
the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to “recover damages
for emotional distress caused by her fear for the safety of her son
and from witnessing her son’s injuries,” when she was “in the ‘zone
of danger’ of physical impact, . . . experienced a reasonable fear for
her own safety,” and “demonstrated physical manifestations of
138
emotional distress.”
The court of appeals, one judge dissenting, held that she was
139
There was no dispute over the issue of
not entitled to recover.
whether the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for damages
140
based on her fear for her own safety, but the court of appeals—
relying on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Stadler v.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Engler v. Wehmas, 633 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 873.
Id. at 872.

05STEENSON.DOC

2006]

5/31/2006 1:11:09 PM

ENGLER V. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE CO.

1355

141

Cross and its own decision in Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance
142
Co. —held that she was not entitled to recover damages arising
out of fear for the safety of her son or from witnessing her son’s
143
injuries.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review, but the
parties settled the suit against Wehmas for $50,000, Wehmas’
144
insurance policy limit.
The plaintiff claimed that her damages
exceeded the settlement amount and then brought a claim against
her own automobile insurance company, Illinois Farmers, seeking
145
to recover under her underinsured motorist coverage.
The issue concerning the scope of recoverable damages was

141. 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
142. 520 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). The plaintiff in the case was one
of four young adults who were involved in a one-car rollover accident in which she
sustained serious injuries and her best friend was killed instantly. Id. at 535. She
settled her claims against the driver and, because her damages exceeded the
amount of the settlement, she brought suit against her insurer—Illinois Farmers—
to recover underinsured motorist insurance benefits. Id. She sought to recover
damages for her own personal injuries, the emotional distress that resulted from
those injuries, as well as emotional distress that resulted from witnessing her best
friend’s death. Id. The trial court granted the defendant partial summary
judgment on her claim for emotional distress for witnessing the death of her best
friend. Id. The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 535,
538.
The plaintiff admitted that this part of her claim did not arise out of
physical injury. Id. at 536. Instead of arguing that she was in the zone of danger
and all her emotional harm was related to her physical injuries in the accident, she
argued that her claim was “covered by a new cause of action which allows recovery
for negligently inflicted emotional distress without attendant physical harm as
long as the surrounding circumstances suggest the distress is genuine.” Id. at 53637.
The court of appeals rejected the claim in part because of the lack of an
allegation of physical manifestations arising out of the emotional distress and in
part because it concluded that the defendant owed no duty to her to guard against
the risk of emotional harm from witnessing the death of her friend, stating:
While the tortfeasor had a duty to protect both Carlson and her friend
from physical harm because they were passengers in his car, he had no
duty to protect Carlson from distress arising from the fate of her friend.
To hold otherwise would impose on a negligent tortfeasor liability out of
proportion to his culpability.
Id. at 537.
The court treated her claim as a bystander recovery claim. Id. at 538.
Because her claim for emotional harm from witnessing her friend’s death was
unrelated to her own personal injuries, the court saw her as in the same position
as the plaintiff bystanders in Stadler, and that her physical injuries were no
indication of the reliability of her claim for emotional harm. Id.
143. Engler, 633 N.W.2d at 873.
144. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 2005).
145. Id.

05STEENSON.DOC

1356

5/31/2006 1:11:09 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

146

raised at the district court level.
The court held that Engler was
not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress from fear for
147
her son’s safety or witnessing her son’s injury.
The court of
148
appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion and the supreme
149
court reversed.
B. The Briefs
The statement of facts in the appellant’s brief said that when
Engler first saw her son she believed he was dead, and that
[a]s a result of experiencing this harrowing event, Ms.
Engler began experiencing symptoms of emotional
distress. Most of her symptoms were in response to
witnessing, helplessly, what happened to Jeffrey, including
the effects of seeing his small, bloodied, lifeless body in
the ditch. Emotionally she was out of control. She had
difficulty coping with day-to-day responsibilities. She was
diagnosed with, and continues to suffer from, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and depression as a
direct result of this incident. Her symptoms of PTSD
currently include: anxiety, overprotectiveness, fear,
nightmares, flashbacks, a 70 lb.+ weight gain and
uncontrollable feelings of sadness. She has also been
depressed since the accident, resulting in symptoms of
irritability, decrease in sexual desire and lack of
150
sociability.
The brief made a point of emphasizing that most of the
emotional harm the plaintiff suffered was a result of witnessing the
injury to her son, rather than fear for her own safety.
The issue as framed in the appellant’s brief was whether a
plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of physical impact,
experiences reasonable fear for her own safety, and demonstrates
physical manifestations of emotional distress may “also recover
damages for emotional distress caused by her fear for the safety of
151
her son and from witnessing her son’s injuries.” The brief made
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. A04-1445, 2005 WL 704100, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005).
149. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 772.
150. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 5, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445).
151. Id. at 1.
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a straightforward argument that the basic elements of a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim were met, and that the
plaintiff should therefore be entitled to recover for all the damages
152
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence, relying on the
supreme court’s classical statement in 1896 in Christianson v.
153
Chicago St. Paul M & O Railway Co.
If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a
particular act would or might result in any injury to
anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent
at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person
guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate
consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or
not. Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the act is one
which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to
have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others,
then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from
it, although he could not have anticipated the particular
154
injury which did happen.
The appellant also argued that the plaintiff had to meet a
heavy burden of proof in establishing the elements of a negligent
155
infliction of emotional distress claim in Minnesota, and that
limiting the plaintiff’s right to recover to only those damages
caused by fear for her own safety would create “an unprecedented,
unrealistic, and impossible standard that in no way reflects the full
measure of the emotional distress caused by the tortfeasor’s
156
negligence.”
The statement of facts in the brief for the respondent
understated the nature of her injuries:
Appellant testified that while at first she thought that
the Wehmas vehicle was going to hit her, Jacob and Brent
Renner, she also testified that it happened so quickly she
really didn’t have an estimation as to how long she herself
was in fear.
Appellant testified that it was a couple of months after
the accident that she sought medical treatment for her
own symptoms, i.e., post-traumatic stress. Appellant
152.
153.
154.
11).
155.
156.

Id. at 11.
67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641 (quoted in Appellant’s Brief, supra note 150, at
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 150, at 9.
Id. at 15.
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testified that she sought medical treatment because she
would cry all the time for no reason, couldn’t get out of
bed and was irritable. Appellant testified she didn’t feel
like herself, she couldn’t function normally and didn’t
157
have any ambition.
The argument against permitting recovery for fear for
another’s safety by a person in the zone of danger was based in part
on the lack of Minnesota precedent and in part on the concerns
the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed in 1980 in Stadler v.
158
Cross, when it rejected bystander recovery because of concerns
about limiting the persons who would be entitled to recover under
159
that theory.
The brief also argued that the law in other
jurisdictions supported denial of recovery also, including a
160
reference to an American Law Reports Annotation, asserting that
four states—Minnesota, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Virginia—deny
recovery for emotional distress caused by witnessing negligent
injury to another, although the cases do not support that
161
proposition.
Focusing on bystander recovery jurisdictions, the brief argued
that permitting recovery for one in the zone of danger who fears
for the safety of another would create the same problems that have
existed in California, where bystander recovery rules have shifted as
the California Supreme Court has struggled to define appropriate
limits for persons seeking to recover because of emotional distress
162
suffered in witnessing injuries to third persons.
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Minnesota Trial
Lawyers Association (MTLA) also argued that “fear for one’s own
safety” is only appropriate for purposes of determining whether a
claimant was within the “zone of danger” created by the accident,
but that once the plaintiff satisfies that standard, “fear for one’s
157. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 5, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445).
158. 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980).
159. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 157, at 7-10.
160. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander
Plaintiff Must Suffer Physical Impact or Be in Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R. 5th 255 (2001).
The annotation specifically says that the four jurisdictions “do not allow recovery
under any circumstances for emotional distress caused by witnessing negligent
injury to another.” Id. § 2a. Suffice it to say that the cases the annotation cites do
not support that proposition.
161. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 157, at 13.
162. Id. at 15-19.
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163

own safety” should be rejected as a test for damages. Instead, the
brief argued, “damages should reasonably include all harm
164
proximately caused by the negligence of the tortfeasor.”
The
MTLA brief stressed, as did the Appellant’s brief, that it was not
seeking any change in the existing standards used to determine
165
whether a person in the zone of danger is entitled to recover.
Much of the MTLA brief focused on the propriety of using
“fear for one’s safety” as the standard for damages in cases where
166
emotional harm is caused by witnessing injury to another.
The
brief argued that the standard is inadequate for a variety of reasons,
including the illogic of focusing on only one form of a complex
167
emotional reaction to a traumatic event.
The issue as framed in the Minnesota Defense Lawyers
Association (MDLA) amicus brief was “[s]hould Minnesota
recognize an entirely new cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress for bystanders who experience emotional
168
The brief
distress as a result of fear for the safety of another?”
argued that not only does Minnesota law not recognize bystander
claims, but that to do so would result in an undue expansion of
liability through the application of a standard that has proven
169
difficult to administer.
The brief relied heavily on bystander
170
recovery cases in constructing the argument.
C. The Opinion
The supreme court noted that the issue of “whether a person
who is in the zone of danger and who fears both for his or her own
safety and for the safety of another may recover for distress caused
by fearing for the other’s safety or witnessing the other’s injury” is a
163. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers
Association at 1, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No.
A04-1445).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 17-26.
167. Id.
168. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association at 1,
Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445).
169. Id. at 11-18.
170. Id. (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 523-24
(Cal. 1963); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Okrina v. Midwestern
Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 404-06, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1969); Iacona v. Schrupp, 521
N.W.2d 70, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Carlson v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d
534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
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171

question of first impression in Minnesota.
The court began its
analysis of the issue with a standard analysis of the three primary
rules courts have adopted to resolve claims for emotional harm by
bystanders who have witnessed another’s peril or injury: the impact,
172
zone of danger, and bystander recovery rules.
The bystander recovery rule, based on variations of the
173
California Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Dillon v. Legg, is the
most commonly accepted rule, adopted by some twenty nine states,
174
according to the court’s count in Engler.
The impact rule is still
followed by three jurisdictions and the zone of danger rule by
175
The numbers vary, depending on who does the counting,
ten.
176
but the predominant rule is the bystander recovery rule.
171. Engler , 706 N.W.2d at 768.
172. Id. at 768-70.
173. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
174. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 769.
175. Id. at 768-69.
176. Breakdown of States Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress:
I. No test for NIED (2 total jurisdictions).
Jurisdictions not recognizing NIED:
Gideon v. Norfolk S. Corp., 633 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 1994) (per
curium); Mech. Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark.
1988).
II. Direct impact test (6 total).
Jurisdictions recognizing NIED for bystander recovery and
applying the physical (or direct) impact rule. This rule requires
that a plaintiff seeking damages for emotional injury stemming
from a negligent act must have also contemporaneously sustained
a physical impact or injury due to the defendant’s conduct:
Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 85 (Ga. 2000);
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464 (Idaho
1996); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988);
Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980); Kraszewski v.
Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., 916 P.2d 241, 247-48 (Okla. 1996);
Hammond v. Cent. Lane Commc’n Ctr., 816 P.2d 593, 597 (Or.
1991).
III. Zone of Danger Tests (13 total).
1. Zone of Danger jurisdictions stating that a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action requires the plaintiff to (1)
witness an injury to a closely related person, (2) suffer mental
anguish manifested as physical injury, and (3) be within the zone
of danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm created by the defendant (whether the plaintiff must also be
found to be in reasonable fear for his/her own safety at the time
of the accident is indicated in parenthesis):
Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165
(Ariz. 1989); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Colo.
1978); Nutt v. A.C. & S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 24 (Del. Super. Ct.
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1983); William v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990)
(requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety); Rickey v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (requiring
plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety); Resavage v. Davies, 86
A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d
764, 770-71 (Minn. 2005) (requiring plaintiff also fear for
his/her own safety); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848
(N.Y. 1984); Nielson v. AT & T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434, 441
(S.D. 1999); Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425
A.2d 92, 95 (Vt. 1980) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her
own safety).
2. Zone of Danger jurisdictions where the victim does not have to
prove mental anguish as manifested by a physical injury (the
simple zone of danger test, but all other factors stay the same):
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599600 (Mo. 1990) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own
safety); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684-685
(N.D. 1972) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own
safety); Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah
1992) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety).
IV. The Foreseeability Jurisdictions (30 total). These jurisdictions follow
modified versions of the Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)
foreseeability doctrine:
1. These jurisdictions require that (1) the NIED plaintiff is closely
related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury
producing event at the time it occurs and is aware that it is causing
injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional
distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to
the circumstances. (This test is from Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d
814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989), which modified Dillon):
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989); Fineran v.
Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1991); Nelson v. Flanagan,
677 A.2d 545, 548 (Me. 1996); Satchfield v. R.R. Morrison &
Son, Inc., 872 So. 2d 661, 664 (Miss. 2004); Buck v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 443 (Nev. 1989); Graves v. Estabrook,
818 A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.H. 2003); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521,
528 (N.J. 1980); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 260 (N.M. 1990);
Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1052 (R.I. 1994) (requiring
physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); Kinard v.
Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (S.C. 1985)
(requiring physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress);
Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (requiring
physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); Heldreth v.
Marr, 425 S.E.2d 157, 162 (W. Va. 1992).
2. Jurisdictions that follow the Dillon (as modified by Thing)
foreseeability doctrine, but do not require the NEID plaintiff to be
at the scene of the accident, but often requiring the plaintiff to
arrive shortly thereafter:
Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 865 (Conn. 1996); Zell v.
Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048, 1054 (Fla. 1995) (requires a physical
manifestation/injury of the emotional distress); Lejeune v.
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Adopting the bystander recovery rule would have been one
solution to the issue the court faced in Engler, but the appellant
certainly was not asking the court to adopt that rule. Nonetheless,
the court took the opportunity to note that it had soundly rejected
177
the bystander rule in Stadler. The court said that the advantage of
the zone of danger rule is that it “provides a bright line to limit
recovery,” and avoids the problems of potentially unlimited liability
and the absence of clear standards associated with the bystander
178
recovery rule,
even though the proliferation of claims was
specifically noted by the Stadler court as a non-factor in its
179
decision.
Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990);
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978)
(requiring physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress);
Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 385 N.W.2d 732, 735
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring physical manifestation/injury
of emotional distress); Vosburg v. Cenex-Land O’Lakes
Agronomy Co., 513 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Neb. 1994); Paugh v.
Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766-67 (Ohio 1983); Ramsey v. Beavers,
931 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787
P.2d 553, 557 (Wash. 1990).
3. Jurisdictions that apply the foreseeability doctrine without
reference to the seriousness, severity, or physical manifestation of
the plaintiff’s emotional distress, only requiring that the plaintiff’s
mental anguish be of a kind normally suffered by a reasonable
person. The plaintiff must still (1) have actually witnessed or
come on the scene (2) soon after the death or severe injury of a
loved one (3) with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a
spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused
by the defendant’s negligent or otherwise tortious conduct:
Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Alaska 1987); Groves v.
Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000) (calling for a “direct
involvement” standard); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 685 (Pa.
1979); Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 923-24
(Tex. 1988); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d
432, 445 (Wis. 1994); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 200-01
(Wyo. 1986).
V. The “pure” foreseeability test (3 total).
These jurisdictions only require that serious mental distress to the
plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant’s negligent act:
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 521 (Haw. 1970); Sacco v.
High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont.
1990); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Ass’n, 395
S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990).
177. Engler, 707 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55
(Minn. 1980)).
178. Id. at 771.
179. Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 555 n.3.
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The court in Stadler, however, did not resolve the damages
issue the court faced in Engler. On that issue the court in Engler
held that “a plaintiff may recover damages for distress caused by
fearing for another’s safety or witnessing serious injury to
180
another” if the plaintiff proves she “(1) was in the zone of danger
of physical impact; (2) had an objectively reasonable fear for her
own safety; (3) had severe emotional distress with attendant
physical manifestations; and (4) stands in a close relationship to
181
the third-party victim.”
The court then added a fifth requirement: “the plaintiff also
must establish that the defendant’s negligent conduct—the
conduct that created an unreasonable risk of physical injury to the
182
plaintiff—caused serious bodily injury to the third-party victim.”
Later in the opinion, the court held that the requirement is “either
183
death or serious bodily injury” to the victim.
1.

Zone of Danger of Physical Impact

The plaintiff must be in the zone of danger of physical
184
impact, which seriously limits the utility of zone of danger cases,
effectively limiting it to accident cases. The plaintiff must have
been in “some actual personal physical danger caused by” the
185
186
negligence of the defendant.
It is an objective inquiry.
In
187
the Minnesota Supreme Court denied a
K.A.C. v. Benson,
plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress based
on an invasive physical examination performed on her by a
188
physician suffering from AIDS.
The K.A.C. court held that “a
remote possibility of personal peril is insufficient to place plaintiff
180. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 770.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 770-71.
183. Id. at 772. The Engler court followed the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Bovson v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219 (N.Y. 1984). 706 N.W.2d at 771-72.
184. See Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32
(Minn. 1982) (noting that, in Minnesota, the only exception to the physical injury
requirement “occurs in cases involving a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights
such as defamation, malicious prosecution, or other willful or malicious
conduct”).
185. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Minn. 1995).
186. Id. (citing Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980)).
187. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). For a discussion of the case see supra
notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
188. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555. The plaintiff was not physically injured from
the examinations. Id. at 558.
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within a zone of danger for purposes of a claim of negligent
189
infliction of emotional distress.” The plaintiff must have been “in
some actual personal physical danger caused by defendant’s
190
negligence.”
A plaintiff’s reasonable fear that she is in the zone
of danger would be insufficient if she was not actually in peril of
191
physical harm.
2.

Objectively Reasonable Fear for One’s Own Safety

The plaintiff’s claim for fear for her own safety must be
objectively reasonable. Framed slightly differently, the plaintiff’s
192
anxiety must be a reasonable response to the event.
3.

Severe Emotional Distress with Attendant Physical Manifestations

To substantiate her claim, the plaintiff must prove “severe
193
emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations.” Engler
does not, however, require that those physical manifestations flow
194
By framing the
from the plaintiff’s fear for her own safety.
requirement that way, the court avoided the problems that would
be involved if a trier of fact were required to determine which
emotional reaction, fear for the plaintiff’s own safety or witnessing
injury to a third person, caused the physical manifestations.
A second question concerns the standards for proof of severe
emotional distress. Severe emotional distress is required for both
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in
195
Minnesota.
One of the issues in construing the requirement
concerns the relationship between the two theories.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the independent tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress for the first time in 1983,
196
in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., but the court severely
197
limited the terms and conditions of recovery. This has paved the
way for a steady stream of summary judgments on the issue, either
because the plaintiff’s allegations failed to establish extreme and
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 558.
See Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah 1992).
K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559.
Id. at 557.
Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770-71 (Minn. 2005).
E.g., K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557, 560.
330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983).
Id. at 438-39.
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outrageous conduct, allegations of the severity of the emotional
distress were insufficient, or the evidence of causation between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s distress was inadequate.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress of course does not
require extreme and outrageous conduct, but it does require a
showing of severe emotional distress caused by the defendant’s
198
negligence.
The issue is whether the restrictive cast given to the
severe emotional distress requirement by the Minnesota Supreme
Court applies in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
199
Langeslag v. KYMN Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
most recent decision on the issue, illustrates the rigidity of the
court’s approach to intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. The case arose out of a highly acrimonious employment
relationship between the plaintiff and the principal owner of a
200
radio station.
The plaintiff sued the radio station and principal
owner, Eddy, under an impressive array of theories, including
“breach of contract, violation of Minnesota’s whistle-blower
201
statute, sexual harassment, reprisal, and [sic] aiding and abetting
202
in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), failure
to pay wages, assault, intentional interference with contract,
retaliation for serving a complaint, violation of Minnesota’s equal
203
pay act, wrongful and retaliatory termination, defamation and
204
slander.”
“Eddy counterclaimed, alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and intentional interference with a
205
contractual relationship.”
The procedure was complicated, but
in the end the jury found in favor of the employer, Eddy, on the
plaintiff’s claims against him, except for the whistle-blower and
206
Minnesota Human Rights Act claims.
The jury also found in his
favor on all three of his counterclaim theories, awarding him
$535,000 for his claim of intentional infliction of emotional
207
distress. In a subsequent bench trial, the court found in favor of

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

E.g., K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557-58.
664 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2003).
Id. at 862-63.
MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2002).
Id. § 363.03(1), (2), (6), (7).
Id. § 181.66-.71.
Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 863.
Id.
Id.
Id at 863-64.
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Eddy on the plaintiff’s whistle-blower and Minnesota Human
208
Rights Act claims. The supreme court granted review to consider
only Eddy’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
209
210
counterclaim against the plaintiff. The court reversed.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is an independent
tort. The standard elements, as established in Hubbard v. United
211
Press International, Inc., are extreme and outrageous conduct that
is intentional or reckless and that causes severe emotional
212
distress.
Hubbard cautioned that the tort should be “sharply
213
limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts,” and that a
plaintiff asserting the claim would have to meet a “high threshold
214
standard of proof.”
Taking Hubbard as its test, the court in
Langeslag held that Eddy’s claim failed both because Langeslag’s
conduct was not extreme and outrageous and because Eddy’s proof
that Langeslag’s conduct caused his emotional distress was
215
insufficient.
The standard for determining whether conduct is extreme and
outrageous is whether it is “utterly intolerable to the civilized
216
community.”
The supreme court in Langeslag dissected each
alleged incident, which included filing false police reports, threats
to take legal action, and frequent workplace arguments; and the
217
court held that each incident was insufficient to justify recovery.
Most relevant to this Article is the court’s conclusion that
Eddy’s evidence of severe emotional distress was insufficient to
justify recovery. The court applied the “high threshold” standard
218
to the issue of whether the distress was severe.
The facial test is
whether the distress is so severe that no reasonable person could be
219
expected to endure it.
There was a de novo review of the district court’s decision to
220
deny Langeslag’s motion for JNOV.
The court noted that the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 864.
Id.
Id. at 870.
330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 866-69.
Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439.
Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 866-68.
Id. at 868-69.
Id. at 869 (citing Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439).
Id. at 864.
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evidence would be taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Langeslag, and that the trial court’s ruling would
have to be affirmed if “there was any competent evidence
221
reasonably tending to sustain the verdict.” The court’s statement
of the appropriate review standard, however, seems to be
inconsistent with the “high threshold standard” the court actually
222
applied in reviewing the evidence.
Eddy’s evidence that he suffered severe emotional distress
because of Langeslag’s conduct consisted of his own testimony
223
coupled with his medical records.
Eddy testified to persistent
stomach pain, hair loss, difficulty in sleeping, aggravation of his
224
eczema and diabetes, and impotence.
He also testified that his
225
His medical
doctor had to prescribe antidepressants for him.
records indicated high work-related stress and skin problems, but
the supreme court concluded that the records were insufficient to
establish the necessary causation because of prior criminal
226
problems that provided an alternative explanation for the stress.
Those symptoms pre-dated Langeslag’s police reports, which
provided one of the bases for the intentional infliction of
227
emotional distress claim.
The eczema and diabetes were preexisting conditions and the court concluded that there was no
evidence that they were specifically aggravated by Langeslag’s
228
conduct.
The court held that based on the evidence, the jury
should not have been allowed to consider the emotional distress
229
claim. Noting that Eddy’s claim involved “allegations of complex
medical issues and issues of causation, possibly from multiple
sources,” the court said that in such cases “testimony from the
individual making the claim and inconclusive medical records are
not sufficient to establish a causal connection between the conduct
230
and the emotional distress.”
Rather, the court said, “[t]he
appropriate method of proving the severity and causation of

221.
2002)).
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. (citing Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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emotional distress is through medical testimony.”
The “high threshold standard of proof” required of a
complainant in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, as
applied to the issue of whether emotional distress is sufficiently
severe, translates in practice into a detailed examination of the
facts to determine whether the case should be sent to a jury in the
232
first place.
The issue is whether that standard effectively applies
in cases involving negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
as well.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the impact of the
severity standard in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in Quill v.
233
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The plaintiff, Abrahamson, a frequent
business traveler, was a passenger on a TWA flight that suddenly
rolled over and dropped more than 30,000 feet in forty seconds
234
before the pilot regained control of the airplane.
The airplane
continued to shake and make substantial noise before landing forty
235
minutes later.
The plaintiff sought to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress because of the impact the flight had
236
A frequent business traveler, the plaintiff experienced
on him.
237
anxiety on half of the flights he took after the incident.
The
anxiety manifested itself in “adrenaline surges, sweaty hands, [and]
238
On occasion he had to
elevated pulse and blood pressure.”
postpone flights because of that anxiety and it sometimes would
239
take him two days to relax after a flight.
The plaintiff, a nonpracticing physician, did not consult any medical professionals
240
because he believed they would be unable to help him.
A jury
awarded the plaintiff $50,000 on his negligent infliction of
241
On appeal, TWA argued that the
emotional distress claim.
plaintiff had to meet Hubbard’s demanding standard for severe
242
emotional distress. The court of appeals thought it doubtful that
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id. at 864.
361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.
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the plaintiff would meet that standard because of the lack of
medical evidence to support his claim, but the court said that it was
unnecessary to decide the issue because it concluded that the
Hubbard standard was inapplicable in claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress:
First, the supreme court did not state the independent
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
displaced all other torts in which damages for emotional
distress had been allowed. Second, cases decided as
recently as Langeland refer to physical symptoms without
suggesting plaintiffs must meet the high threshold
adopted in Hubbard. Minnesota law has long separated
the two emotional distress torts, not recognizing one until
90 years after adopting the other. We see little basis for
borrowing an element from one to add to the other,
particularly when the zone of danger rule provides an
indicia of genuineness the intentional tort requirements
243
lack.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence the court noted
that its “task is problematic for no clear line can be drawn between
244
mental and physical injury,” but the court concluded that, given
the unique circumstances of the accident, the plaintiff’s reaction,
including sweaty hands, elevated blood pressure, and other
245
evidence relating to fear of flying was sufficient to justify recovery.
246
In contrast, in State by Woyke v. Tonka Corp., which arose out
of claims by the plaintiffs related to the defendant’s disposal of
hazardous waste on the plaintiffs’ property, the court of appeals
held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for
247
emotional distress.
The court’s summary of the evidence
consisted of a complaint by Mrs. Woyke that her hair was falling out
248
and that the children suffered more colds than previously.
The
court said that the trial court was properly skeptical of the
subjective testimony of emotional distress in the absence of medical
249
evidence.
Citing Hubbard, the court of appeals noted the
conspicuous absence of medical evidence and said that “[a]bsent

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 443-44.
420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 629.
Id. at 627.
Id.
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an objective showing of physical manifestations of emotional
distress, a damage award for negligent infliction of emotional
250
distress is not usually appropriate.”
The absence of medical testimony is not always the specific
reason for the denial of recovery in negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims, however.
In Leaon v. Washington
251
County,
the plaintiff, a Washington County deputy sheriff,
brought suit against the county and law enforcement personnel
who were organizers of a stag party that got out of hand and
resulted in his forced participation in acts that he found distressing
252
and humiliating. The plaintiff sued for negligent and intentional
253
infliction of emotional distress, in addition to other theories.
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in refusing to permit the plaintiff’s motion to add a claim for
254
negligent infliction of emotional distress to his complaint.
Donald Leaon testified that “he lost weight (later regained),
became depressed, and exhibited feelings of anger, fear, and
255
bitterness.”
The court simply held that those symptoms did not
satisfy the physical manifestations test, without mentioning any
necessity of medical testimony, citing, by way of comparison, the
256
court of appeals decision in Quill.
The supreme court has referred to Quill on occasion, although
257
It
perhaps not too much can be drawn from those references.
would be safe to say that it would be a mistake in cases involving
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress to seek
recovery without medical evidence that establishes the link between
the accident and the emotional distress and consequent physical
symptoms. And, notwithstanding the specifically articulated “high
threshold” standard in the intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases, the standards for severe emotional distress seem to
258
bridge the two torts.
250. Id.
251. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
252. Id. at 869.
253. Id. at 870.
254. Id. at 874-75.
255. Id. at 875.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995); Dornfeld v.
Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115(Minn. 1993); Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497
N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993).
258. In Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 n.23
(Wis. 1994), the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically adopted the standard from
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Close Relationship to the Third-Party Victim
259

The court in Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. held that
the plaintiff seeking to recover damages for emotional distress
because of injury to a third person must be “closely related to the
260
third-party victim.”
As with the serious injury requirement, the
court adopted the requirement to limit the liability of a negligent
261
The court
tortfeasor and to authenticate the plaintiff’s distress.
did not further define the term, however, preferring to permit
gradual common law development of the issue, and because the
facts of the case, involving a mother-child relationship, would have
262
satisfied even the most restrictive definitions of the term.
Justice Barry Anderson concurred in the court’s opinion, but
wrote separately to express his view that the category of persons
entitled to recover for fear for another’s safety should be more
narrowly confined:
In my view, the use of a “close relationship” test as set
out in the majority opinion is a minimal, at best,
limitation on NIED claims. Not only does the majority
formulation present the specter of the sudden discovery
of a “close relationship” between previously distant
parties, it also invites inquiry into, and controversy about,
relationships thought to be “close,” e.g., a married couple
experiencing conflict or sibling disputes of long-running
duration. Surely there will be requests by defense counsel
for a special interrogatory on the jury verdict form to
address the question of whether the plaintiff had the

intentional infliction of emotional distress for negligence cases involving claims
for emotional harm.
259. 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005).
260. Id. at 772. The Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of
Appeals have permitted recovery under the Civil Damage Act, Minnesota Statutes
section 340A.801, subdivision 1, when the person seeking recovery was not
married to the person whose injury prompted the means of support claim under
the Act. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Minn.
1998) (plaintiff and daughter, who were living with plaintiff’s fiancé, entitled to
recover for loss of means of support as a result of injuries to him); Skelly v. Mount,
620 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (ex-wife who was living with her
husband to help him with alcoholism held to be another person entitled to
recover under the Civil Damage Act for loss of means of support due to her exhusband’s death). Those cases would be irrelevant on the issue of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, however, because they involve the construction of
a statute.
261. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 772.
262. Id.
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requisite “close relationship” to qualify for recovery.
Instead, I would require that NIED claims be further
limited to circumstances where the third-party victim is a
spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling
263
of the plaintiff.
He acknowledged that there is “some arbitrariness” in his
approach, but thought that it was necessary to establish workable
264
limits for the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The court said that it agreed with decisions in other
jurisdictions that have adopted a close relationship requirement,
265
noting two decisions, Bovsun v. Sanperi, a New York Court of
266
Appeals case, and Keck v. Jackson, an Arizona Supreme Court
decision, although New York has adopted a narrower approach that
limits recovery to certain family members and Keck has been
267
interpreted to apply to familial or similar relationships.
Bovsun
held that a plaintiff in the zone of danger is entitled to recover
“damages for injuries suffered in consequence of the observation of
the serious injury or death of a member of his or her immediate
family,” assuming the necessary causal connection between the
268
damages and the defendant’s negligence.
Subsequent decisions
in New York have adhered to that limitation. In Trombetta v.
269
Conkling, the New York Court of Appeals refused to extend
Bovsun to a case involving a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for
witnessing the death of her aunt, who was killed instantly when hit
by a truck as the plaintiff was trying to pull her out of the path of
270
the truck.
The plaintiff was not physically injured or touched in
271
The plaintiff’s mother had died when she was
the accident.
272
eleven and her aunt became the maternal figure in her life. They
always lived close to each other and participated in activities
273
together on a daily basis. The court of appeals held that she was

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. (Anderson, Barry, J., concurring).
Id. at 772-73.
461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984).
593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979).
706 N.W.2d at 772.
461 N.E.2d at 848.
626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not entitled to recover, limiting recovery as a matter of policy.
Aside from concerns about an unmanageable proliferation of
claims, the court said that the restriction of negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims “to a discrete readily determinable class
also takes cognizance of the complex responsibility that would be
imposed on the courts in this area to assess an enormous range and
array of emotional ties of, at times, an attenuated or easily
275
embroidered nature.”
More recently, the New York Supreme Court Appellate
276
Division in Jun Chi Guan v. Tuscan Dairy Farms
considered
whether a grandmother was a member of the immediate family
within the meaning of Bovsun. The plaintiff was pushing her twoand-a-half year old grandson in a carriage when both were allegedly
277
hit by a truck owned by the defendant. The plaintiff was thrown
278
in the air as a result of the collision. She suffered a broken thigh
279
280
and other injuries. Her grandson died. The plaintiff provided
281
full-time care for her grandson, six days a week. She argued that
given the culture of the Chinese family, she was a member of her
282
grandson’s “immediate family.”
The appellate division rejected
283
the claim, applying the Bovsun limitation.
Arizona, also a zone of danger jurisdiction, has similar
284
limitations. In Keck v. Jackson, the plaintiff and her mother were
involved in an automobile accident that killed the plaintiff’s
mother and caused serious injuries to the plaintiff. The Arizona
Supreme Court held that a person in the zone of danger could
recover for emotional distress resulting “from witnessing an injury
to a person with whom the plaintiff has a close personal
285
relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise.”
274. Id. at 655.
275. Id. at 655-56.
276. 806 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Div. 2005).
277. Id. at 714.
278. Id. at 715-16 (Miller, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 714, 716.
280. Id. at 714-15.
281. Id. at 716.
282. Id. at 714 (majority opinion).
283. Id. at 715.
284. 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979).
285. Id. at 670. The court cited the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Leong
v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) as an example. Hawaii is a bystander
recovery jurisdiction. See id. at 762 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw.
1970) for the proposition that Hawaii permits claims of “negligently-inflicted
mental distress unaccompanied by resulting physical injuries”). The court in
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Although the decision seems broad, particularly since it
appears to extend beyond family relationships, the Arizona Court
of Appeals read it more narrowly in Hislop v. Salt River Project
286
Agricultural Improvement & Power District, a case involving claims by
the plaintiffs for emotional distress they suffered as a result of
seeing a friend and co-worker die by electrocution. The resulting
fireball also momentarily engulfed the plaintiffs, although they
287
were not burned. The Hislop court interpreted Keck to mean that
while a blood relationship is not necessarily required, “there must
still be a familial relationship, or something closely akin” to it to
288
justify recovery. Without deciding the outer limits of liability, and
whether those limits were limited to the family relationships, the
court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for
289
witnessing injury to a co-worker and friend.
It would of course be a mistake to draw too much from the
court’s references to Keck and Bovsun. The court’s reference to
those decisions does not mean that the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Engler intended to apply the same approaches, nor does it mean
that the court intended to reject those approaches. The court
clearly expressed its preference to instead let the law on the close
relationship issue evolve on a case-by-case basis.
One of the particularly interesting aspects of the New York
decisions discussed above is that the plaintiffs in both cases were in
the zone of danger, and the plaintiff in Jun Chi Guan was seriously
injured, in the accidents that resulted in the injuries to or deaths of
290
the closely related persons. New York courts denied recovery to a
291
292
grandparent and niece, both of whom had close relationships
to the accident victims. In particular, as to the plaintiff in Jun Chi
Guan, the issue is why the zone of danger rule should limit recovery
Leong held that the absence of a blood relationship was not a bar to recovery by a
ten-year-old boy for mental and emotional distress because of witnessing the death
of his stepgrandmother. Id. at 766. In reaching its conclusion, the court
emphasized both the unique nature of extended family relationships in Hawaii
and also the unique Hawaiian concept of adoption. See id.
286. 5 P.3d 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
287. Id. at 268.
288. Id. at 269.
289. Id. at 272.
290. Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993); Jun Chi Guan v.
Tuscan Dairy Farms, 806 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Div. 2005) (grandmother who
witnessed grandson’s death sustained a broken thigh and other injuries).
291. Jun Chi Guan, 806 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
292. Trombetta, 626 N.E.2d at 653-54.
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in a case where the plaintiff has sustained personal injuries.
Oklahoma, as an example, deals with those situations by classifying
plaintiffs who suffer physical injury as direct victims who are then
entitled to recover for all the emotional harm that flows from the
293
accident. In Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc.,
the plaintiff and his wife were holding hands and walking when
they were hit by an intoxicated driver. The husband was hit in the
294
shoulder, chest, and knee. His wife was torn away from him and
295
dragged down the street under the car that hit her.
She died
296
He asserted claims for both intentional and
later in the day.
297
He was treated as a
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
direct victim for purposes of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim, which entitled him to recover damages resulting
from fear for his wife’s safety, even though his injuries were
298
slight.
299
In Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that a person who suffers a
physical injury because of a defendant’s negligence is entitled to
300
recover for the accompanying mental anguish. The court viewed
that sort of claim as separate from a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress where the plaintiff is in the zone of danger and
301
suffers no physical injury.
If the two categories of cases are kept
separate, there should be no reason for the limiting rules from
zone of danger cases to cross over and apply to what Oklahoma has
302
called “direct victim” cases.
This should be true even in cases
where the plaintiff’s physical injuries are slight in comparison to
the emotional damages suffered as a result of witnessing injury to a
293. 916 P.2d 241 (Okla. 1996).
294. Id. at 244.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 244-45.
298. Id. at 247. The jury found for the plaintiff but did not award him money
damages for his injuries. Id. at 247 n.16. There are other examples. E.g.,
Boryszewski v. Burke, 882 A.2d 410, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(reinstating $5,000,000 damages awards by jury for each of three children whose
mother was killed in a car accident that crushed her skull and slightly injured the
children).
299. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996).
300. Id. at 560.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 246
(Okla. 1996) (“Direct victims are those plaintiffs which are involved directly in an
accident but whose emotional damages are caused by the suffering of another.”).
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third person. A good test of the rule would be the Minnesota
Court of Appeals case, Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., in
which the plaintiff sought recovery for witnessing the death of her
303
best friend in an automobile accident.
The plaintiff sustained
serious injuries in a one-car rollover accident and her best friend
304
died. The plaintiff was denied recovery for emotional harm from
305
witnessing her friend’s death. While the court of appeals viewed
the plaintiff’s right to recover for that emotional harm as a duty
306
issue,
Lickteig would appear to justify recovery because the
plaintiff suffered physical injury.
5.

Serious Bodily Injury to the Third-Party Victim

Section 436 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not require
actual injury to the third person. It specifically applies where
bodily harm to the plaintiff is caused by “shock or fright at harm or
307
peril” to a member of the plaintiff’s immediate family. Minnesota
deviates from the Restatement requirement in requiring death or
308
serious bodily injury to the third-party victim.
IV. MECHANICS OF SUBMITTING THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CASE TO A JURY
There are two questions concerning the submission of
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases to a jury. One
concerns the instructions and the other the supporting special
verdict forms. In a standard negligent infliction of emotional
distress case there are four questions that have to be answered: (1)
Was the plaintiff in the zone of danger of physical impact, or, in the
alternative, was the plaintiff in actual physical danger in the
accident? (2) Did the plaintiff reasonably fear for her own safety?
(3) Did the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress? (4) Did the
severe emotional distress cause physical manifestations or
309
symptoms?
In a case where the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a
result of witnessing injury to a third persons there are two
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

520 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537-38.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (3) (1965) (emphasis added).
Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 770.
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additional questions: (5) Is the plaintiff in a close relationship with
the third-party victim? (6) Did the defendant cause the third-party
310
victim serious bodily injury or death?
These issues would be in
addition to the standard questions concerning negligence and
311
direct cause, which would have to be answered affirmatively
before the additional questions would be in issue.
Questions one, two, four, and six could be the subject of
special verdict questions without accompanying jury instructions.
Question three—the “severe emotional distress” issue—likely needs
to be defined for a jury. And question five, the close relationship
issue, could potentially be the subject of a jury instruction.
The pattern Minnesota instruction covering intentional
infliction of emotional distress states as an element that “the
distress must have been so severe that no reasonable person could
312
be expected to endure it.”
The key issue is whether the severe
emotional distress standards for intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress are effectively the same. There is also a
question as to whether the standard should be further defined to
provide greater guidance for a jury.
The issue is handled differently, depending on the
jurisdiction. Ohio’s pattern instruction requires a showing of
serious emotional distress, which it defines as follows:
Serious emotional distress describes injury which is both
severe and debilitating. It does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression or mere
trivialities. Thus, serious emotional distress may be found
where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would
be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress
caused by the circumstances of the case. It is mental
anguish of a nature that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure. You may consider any evidence of a
resulting physical condition in judging the degree of
313
emotional distress suffered.
California also requires serious emotional distress. The
Judicial Council of California pattern instruction defines
“emotional distress” to include “suffering, anguish, fright, horror,
310. Id. at 770-71.
311. See 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 25.10, 27.10
(4th ed. 1999).
312. Id. at 60.75. The standard is drawn from Hubbard v. United Press
International, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983).
313. 2 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS 219.05 (2002).
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nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and shame,”
and states that “[s]erious emotional distress exists if an ordinary,
314
reasonable person would be unable to cope with it.”
Tennessee’s pattern instruction on negligent infliction of
emotional distress requires the emotional injury to the plaintiff to
be “serious or severe,” defined as “one which causes a reasonable
person, normally constituted, to be unable to adequately cope with
315
the mental stress arising from the circumstances of the event.”
The instruction also states that “[t]he emotional injury must be
316
established by expert medical or scientific proof.”
The Pennsylvania pattern instructions offer two alternatives.
The first alternative simply states that “[t]he plaintiff claims that
the negligent conduct of the defendant caused [him] [her] to
317
suffer emotional injuries.”
The second, which defines what
constitutes physical injury, is as follows:
The plaintiff claims that [he] [she] was near the scene
of an accident and observed injury to a close family
member caused by the negligent conduct of the
defendant, and that as a result [he himself] [she herself]
suffered a physical injury in addition to [his] [her]
emotional injuries.
I will give you examples of injuries that are considered
physical injuries. These injuries include but are not
limited to continued nausea or headaches, repeated
hysterical
attacks,
insomnia,
severe
depression,
318
nightmares, stress, nervousness, or anxiety.
The South Carolina pattern instructions state that “the
emotional distress must both manifest itself by physical symptoms
capable of objective diagnosis and be established by expert
319
testimony.”
Delaware, a zone of danger jurisdiction, has two pattern
instructions, one for cases where the plaintiff is in the zone of
danger and seeks recovery for his or her emotional distress and the
other where the claim is for fright or severe emotional distress
314.
315.
(2005).
316.
317.
(2003).
318.
319.

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1621 (2006).
8 TENNESSEE PRACTICE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS T.P.I.-CIV. 4.36B
Id.
PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.07
Id.
ANDERSON’S SOUTH CAROLINA REQUESTS TO CHARGE—CIVIL § 29-1 (2002).
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suffered because of witnessing injury to a close relative. The first
instruction simply states that “[i]f someone’s negligence causes
fright or severe emotional distress to a person within the immediate
area of physical danger created by that negligence, and if the
person suffers physical consequences as a result of that severe
emotional distress, then the injured person may recover
320
damages.”
The second instruction, where the injury is to a close relative,
and the plaintiff is in the zone of danger, reads as follows:
A person may recover damages for fright or severe
emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing an
injury negligently caused to a close relative only if:
(1) the person was in the immediate area of physical
danger created by the negligent party; and
(2) the person suffered physical injury as a result of the
emotional distress.
If you find that [plaintiff’s name] suffered severe
emotional distress and then physical injury from
witnessing [__describe negligent act to a close relative__]
and that [plaintiff’s name] was within an immediate area
of physical danger created by [defendant’s name]’s
negligence, then [defendant’s name] is liable for
321
damages.
It would seem to be unnecessary to tell a jury that the physical
symptoms or emotional injury have to be established by medical or
expert or scientific evidence, as in the South Carolina and
Tennessee instructions. That issue should be a threshold issue for
the court to decide in determining whether to permit a negligent
infliction of emotional distress case to go to a jury in the first place.
The issue of whether there has to be a lengthier explanation of
what constitutes severe emotional distress is a separate question.
Providing examples of physical symptoms or injuries might be
helpful to a jury. The Pennsylvania instruction does that, but the
heavily fact-dependent determination of what physical symptoms
are sufficient may caution against trying to define the term. Once
again, the trial court will have to determine whether the plaintiff’s
evidence of physical symptoms is sufficient to submit to the jury.
The jury’s function would be to determine whether the plaintiff in
320. SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE ONLINE CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
COMPLETE & ANNOTATED § 14.3 (2000).
321. Id. at § 14.4.
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fact exhibited physical symptoms and whether they were caused by
the emotional distress.
Minnesota law would require a special verdict question on the
issue of whether the plaintiff’s distress is severe. If the pattern
instruction on intentional infliction of emotional distress is
322
followed, the jury would be instructed that the distress would
have to be “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
323
to endure it,” a definition that comes from the intentional
infliction of emotional distress cases. If in fact physical symptoms
are required, a second question would ask the jury whether the
distress directly caused physical symptoms. The trial judge would
presumably be the gatekeeper on that issue, as well as the issue of
whether medical evidence established those symptoms. In most
cases it will be a requirement, unless there is an extraordinary
combination of circumstances, as in the Quill case, where recovery
324
would be permitted without that showing.
The close relationship issue may be the subject of a special
325
verdict question.
Justice Barry Anderson, concurring in Engler,
326
There will always be pressure to adopt a
thought that it would.
327
bright line approach to the issue, but even in cases where there is
a brighter line defining the relationships that will justify recovery
the quality of the relationship may present an issue that has bearing
on the damages the plaintiff claims.
If the close relationship issue is left open, there is an issue of
establishing guidelines to assist in making that determination. This
is especially true since the supreme court has not yet indicated the
parameters of the relationship necessary to support recovery by a
plaintiff in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim where

322. 4A MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 60.75 (4th ed.
1999).
323. Id.
324. Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(where the plaintiff was involved in the severe loss of control of an airplane). For
discussion, see supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
325. See generally Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander’s Cause of Action for Emotional
Injury: Reflections on the Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 512
(1996) (discussing the requirements relating to the relationship between the
emotionally distressed bystander and the physically injured party in emotional
distress cases).
326. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 2005)
(Anderson, Barry, J., concurring).
327. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988); Dunphy v.
Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
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she is claiming damages arising from witnessing injury to a third
party.
New Jersey law provides an example of what could evolve in
Minnesota. The New Jersey guidelines for emotional distress in
bystander cases require a plaintiff to prove “a marital or intimate,
familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured
328
person.”
That grouping potentially includes co-habitants,
329
The New
fiancés, as well as others with strong emotional bonds.
Jersey Supreme Court established guidelines for determining
whether the relationship is sufficiently close:
We acknowledge that this critical determination must be
guided as much as possible by a standard that focuses on
those factors that identify and define the intimacy and
familial nature of such a relationship. That standard must
take into account the duration of the relationship, the
degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common
contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of
shared experience, and, as expressed by the Appellate
Division, “whether the plaintiff and the injured person
were members of the same household, their emotional
reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day
relationship, and the manner in which they related to
each other in attending to life’s mundane
330
requirements.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court thought it a jury issue: “Our
courts have shown that the sound assessment of the quality of
interpersonal relationships is not beyond a jury’s ken and that
courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the
legalities, of relationships to assure that resulting emotional injury
331
is genuine and deserving of compensation.”
The alternative is for a court to determine whether a particular
relationship is sufficiently close to justify submitting the damages
issue to the jury. The quality of the relationship will then be
assessed by the jury in determining the damages to which the
plaintiff is entitled for emotional distress. It is not clear which
position the supreme court will take on the issue, of course.

328. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
329. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380.
330. Id. at 378 (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota rules governing recovery for emotional distress
are for the most part well settled. The supreme court has adhered
332
to the basic zone of danger rule adopted in Purcell for some one
333
The court has indicated that it has
hundred and fourteen years.
334
been cautious in its approach to recovery for emotional harm. Its
decisions certainly bear out that observation.
The zone of danger rule, once a progressive rule when it was
adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Purcell, is now
overshadowed by the bystander recovery rule, which has been
adopted by most jurisdictions considering the issue. The court
took the opportunity in Engler to reaffirm that rule, as did the
predecessor court in Stadler over twenty years earlier.
Engler is a limited decision, however. It doesn’t profess to be
anything else. The damages recoverable in a zone of danger case
are expanded only slightly by the decision, although the expansion
seems to be perfectly consistent with previously settled law in
Minnesota permitting recovery for all the direct consequences of a
personal injury.
In a sense, one might ask what’s the fuss? The decision to
permit the plaintiff to recover damages for witnessing what could
have been fatal injury to her son doesn’t open the floodgates and it
doesn’t mean the legal sky is falling. Allowing someone who is in
the zone of danger to recover for the direct consequences of a
defendant’s negligence isn’t equivalent to permitting bystander
recovery, even without the close relationship requirement that the
court in Engler imposed as a limitation on recovery. The court
seemed to implicitly recognize that severe and undifferentiated
emotional distress flows from involvement in a catastrophic
occurrence.
Application of the Engler rules may be problematic, but they
are not unworkable. The range of special verdict questions and
potential jury instructions that will be necessary to apply the rules
in zone of danger cases is relatively limited. The broader questions
concerning the fairness and utility of the basic zone of danger rules
will await another day.
332.
333.
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years).
334.
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